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The Case for Government 
Supported Training Program 
Morley Gunderson 
Concepts of Public Expenditure Economies are applied 
to the opération of labour markets in gênerai and training 
programs in particular to see if the free market provides a 
socially optimal amount of training. The case for government-
supported training is discussed when there exist market imper-
fections and equity considérations, as well as market failure 
due to externalitiesy high risk and uncertainty, and merit 
goods. 
Although the literature in manpower économies abounds with cost-
benefit évaluations of training programs, little attention has been paid 
to the question of the appropriate rôle of government in such training. 
The basic questions to be answered are : Does the free market provide 
a socially optimal amount of training ? If not, could the government 
intervene to ensure a socially optimal amount of training? 
This paper deals with thèse questions by applying some of the 
newer developments in the literature of Public Expenditure Economies 
to the opération of labour markets in gênerai and training programs in 
particular. The paper begins with a discussion of the rôle of government 
when market failure results because of externalities, high risk and un-
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certainty, and merit goods. Then 
the effect of various types of non-
competitive markets is discussed and 
the paper concludes with a discus-
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sion of the equity or distributional effects of training. Throughout the 
paper stress is placed on identifying the rôle of government when the 
private unregulated market fails to provide a socially efficient or équitable 
amount of training. Emphasis is placed on the micro-economic issues 
of efficient and équitable resource allocation rather than on the macro-
economic issues of stabilization which hâve been discussed extensively 
elsewhere.l 
EXTERNALITIES 
Externalities arise when the production or consumption by one actor 
affects the production function of a producer or the utility function of 
a consumer, and it is not possible to hâve a market that extracts full 
payment or compensation for thèse effects. The possibility of a market 
for externalities dépends not only on the ability to exclude non-payers 
but also on the existence of information to permit market transactions — 
both of which may be very costly. Thèse transactions costs include : 
exclusion costs; costs of disequilibrium; and costs of communication and 
information, including both the supplying and the learning of the terms 
on which transactions can be carried out. The existence of externalities 
is not a sufficient condition for government intervention since many of 
thèse costs will also be présent for governments. However, as Arrow2 
points out, « The State may frequently hâve a rôle to play in resource 
allocation because, by its nature, it has a monopoly of coercive power, 
and coercive power can be used to economize on transaction costs. » 
S pi I lover externalities from gênerai training 
Companies providing gênerai training may produce significant spill-
over benefits to other companies or localities that do not provide training 
but do utilize the trained workers. Rather than undertake their own 
1 James HUGHES, « The Rôle of Manpower Retraining Programs : A Critical 
Look at Retraining in the United Kingdom, » British Journal of Industrial Rela-
tions, Vol. 10, July 1972, pp. 206-223 and J. THIRWELL, «Government Man-
power Policies in Great Britain : Their Rationale and Benefits, •» British Journal 
of Industrial Relations, Vol. 10, July 1972, pp. 165-179. 
2 Kenneth ARROW, « The Organization of Economie Activity : Issues Per-
tinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, » The Analysis and 
Evaluation of Public Expenditures : The PPB System, Vol. 1, Washington, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1969, 610 pp. 
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training programs thèse later companies simply pirate or poach3 the 
trainees from the sponsoring company. As a resuit, profit maximizing 
firms are reluctant to provide such training unless they can sell the 
training service on a market. Because of the inability to sell thèse positive 
spillover benefits the private market yields a less than socially optimal 
amount of training. 
The problem with applying the externality argument to training pro-
grams is that it is difficult to see why markets do not arise to internalize 
the externalities. As Becker4 argues, économie theory predicts that the 
trainee bears the cost of gênerai training (probably by accepting a lower 
wage rate during training) and he reaps the benefits later in the form 
of a higher compétitive market wage rate. If a firm that does no training 
wants to pirate a trained worker from a firm that does training it has to 
attract him through a wage payment sufficiently high to reimburse him 
for his training expenses. According to économie theory a market exists 
for gênerai training and it is thereby not a positive spillover benefit or 
externality. 
Becker's analysis has been accused of being overly simplistic and 
not providing adéquate insight into the real world opération and financing 
of training. In his analysis of internai labour markets Michael Piore5 
states : 
Worker training is a by-product of the process of production and 
of innovation... training, innovation, and current output are joint 
products of a single process... because average cost cannot be ap-
portioned among joint products, it will not serve as an approximation 
to the marginal cost of training. 
Richard Eckaus 6 explores the problem of joint production in the 
context of gênerai training and concludes that : 
The cost of gênerai training under thèse conditions need not be fully 
shifted to workers. It is in fact impossible to know exactly what thèse 
3
 Marshall was the first to use this argument to explain the reluctance of 
private employers to invest in training. This is discussed in Ozay MEHMET, «A 
Critical Appraisal of the Economie Rationale of Government-Subsidized Man-
power Training, » Relations Industrielles, Vol. 25, August 1970, pp. 568-582. 
4
 Gary BECKER, Human Capital, New York, National Bureau of Economie 
Research, 1964, 187 pp. 
5 Michael PIORE, « On-the-Job Training and Adjustment to Technological 
Change, » Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 3, Fall 1968, pp. 435-449. 
6
 Richard ECKAUS, « Investment in Human Capital : A Comment, » Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol. 71, October 1963, pp. 501-504. 
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costs are. The firm produces ; workers become better trained by 
example, by practice, and by maturing in a job situation. The amount 
that the firm will be able to extract from workers in compensation 
for training is not determined by training costs. On the one hand, the 
firm cannot pay the worker less than his marginal productivity in 
goods production in any other line or the worker will make the move 
that his gênerai training makes possible. On the other hand the firm 
cannot avoid giving the training. 
This inability to separate out the costs of training may resuit in the 
firm bearing the cost of gênerai training and the trainee receiving the 
benefits in the form of a higher market wage. Because a market may 
not develop to appropriate the costs to those who benefit, the firm may 
provide a less than socially optimal amount of training. 
In order to better illustrate this point, an expansion of Becker's 
simplistic distinction between gênerai and spécifie training is in order. 
Backer's taxonomy does not cover the cases of training that increases 
the marginal productivity of the worker exclusively in non-sponsoring 
firms or more in non-sponsoring firms than in sponsoring firms. To 
reflect the idea that the benefits for such training will not be capturable 
by the sponsoring company, such training could be classified respectively 
as altruistic and completely altruistic. This leads to the following classi-
fication of training according to how it affects marginal productivity as 
viewed by firms. The first three are terms used by Becker. 
(1) Completely spécifie — increases marginal productivity only in 
sponsoring firm 
(2) Spécifie — increases marginal productivity more in sponsoring 
firm than in other firms 
(3) Completely General — increases marginal productivity the same 
in ail firms 
(4) Altruistic — increases marginal productivity more in non-spon-
soring firms than in sponsoring firms 
(5) Completely altruistic — increases marginal productivity only in 
non-sponsoring firms. 
According to Becker, the firm will bear ail of the cost of completely 
spécifie training and part of the cost of spécifie training. It will not bear 
any of the cost of completely gênerai training. However, if we hold the 
Piore-Eckaus view that training is a joint product the cost of which 
cannot be ascertained so as to be appropriated to those who benefit, then 
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the firm may hâve to pay part or even ail of the costs of completely 
gênerai training, and therefore may be reluctant to provide it. If the 
training is altruistic in the sensé that it increases marginal productivity 
more in non-sponsoring firms than in sponsoring firms then the firm has 
a positive incentive not to provide such training. For if it did, not only 
would it pay the cost of such training but also it would loose that trainee 
to the firm where his marginal productivity is greatest. If it wanted to 
keep the trainee it would hâve to pay him a wage rate equal to his 
highest marginal productivity elsewhere which would be greater than his 
marginal productivity in the sponsoring firm. If the training is com-
pletely altruistic in the sensé that it increases marginal productivity only 
in non-sponsoring firms then the firm would be completely reluctant to 
provide such training. Even if such training were costless in the sensé that 
it were a natural by-product of the worker's normal work activity, the 
firm would hâve an incentive to discourage such training, providing it 
could not sell the training either to the worker or to a non-sponsoring 
company. Otherwise, it would loose the trainee to the company where 
its marginal productivity was greatest or it would hâve to pay him a wage 
equal to that marginal productivity. 
To the extent that it is not possible to develop a market for gênerai, 
altruistic and completely altruistic training of a joint product nature, firms 
may be reluctant to provide such training and in fact it may be in their 
profit maximizing interest to discourage this training. Hence the dictum : 
« We don't want him to get to be too good, or he may go elsewhere. » 
Holtman7 points out however, such underproduction of training 
would resuit from the lack of knowledge of the production of the training, 
not from the joints product nature of training itself. In a perfect labour 
market with knowledge of the joint product nature of training, trainees 
will pay for gênerai training provided as a joint product by accepting a 
lower wage rate during such training. The lower wage rate cornes about 
as workers compete for those jobs giving the gênerai training as a joint 
product. They will fail to compete for thèse jobs only if they don't 
know how much training they are purchasing — a possibility that is 
compounded (but not certain) when training is a joint product. Training 
provided as a joint product does not necessitate market failure — it only 
makes the information problem more likely and hence increases the pos-
sibility of market failure. 
7
 Al HOLTMAN, « Joint Products and On-the-Job Training, » Journal of 
Polittcal Economy, Vol. 79, July-August 1971, pp. 929-931. 
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Vacuum and complementary multiplier externalities 
Richard Judy 8 discusses vacuum and complementary multiplier ef-
fects in the context of externalities. Vacuum effects occur when the trainee 
is upgraded and vacates a job that is filled by a member of the unem-
ployed. The social benefits of such training include the additional income 
from both the upgraded worker and the unemployed worker. This is so 
because in the absence of such training the potentiel trainee would be 
producing at his pre-training productivity and the unemployed worker 
would be completely non-productive and in fact may be receiving govern-
ment transfer payments in the firm of unemployment compensation or 
welfare payments. The valuation of the additional benefits to the trainee 
is clear — it is simply his increase in lifetime productivity. However, the 
valuation for the previously unemployed worker is not so simple because 
of the problem of evaluating the social opportunity cost of being unem-
ployed. At one extrême, unemployment may be valued highly in the 
form of leisure, job search (frictional unemployment) or viable house-
hold alternatives. In thèse cases the valuation to be put on the vacuum 
effect is low since putting thèse people in jobs would do little to increase 
social welfare. At the other extrême, unemployment may hâve no value 
and in fact may hâve severe adverse effects in such forms as aliénation 
or frustration which in turn could lend to anti-social acts such as crime. 
In usual cases however, it is reasonable to assume that the unemployed 
do hâve some positive non-market alternatives but that thèse are not 
valued as high as the alternative of working and therefore the vacuum 
effect is positive. Because of the existence of unions or a légal or social 
minimum wage, the firm is unable to hire this unemployed worker at a 
wage equal to his low alternative cost hence it is not able to reap the 
full benefits of having taken a worker off the rôle of the unemployed. 
Since the full social benefits of the training cannot be brought into its 
calculations, the firm provides a less then socially optimal amount of 
training. 
Training may also hâve a complementary multiplier component 
insofar as it reduces structural bottlenecks that resulted in the unemploy-
ment of related workers. Re-employment of thèse workers would resuit 
in significant social benefits but as in the case of vacuum effects thèse 
benefits may not be captured by whoever bears the cost of the training. 
8 Richard JUDY, « Conceptual Problems and a Theoretical Framework for 
Analysing the Distribution of Benefists from Government Assistant Training-In-
Industry, » Toronto, Systems Research Group, 1970, 47 pp. 
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Option demand externality 
Weisbrod 9 discusses the possibility of government intervention when 
certain individual-consumption goods possess collective-consumption char-
acteristics. In such cases society may be willing to pay for the option to 
use the service in the future either because the service may be extremely 
valuable if needed (e.g. hospitals) or because the décision to discontinue 
the service may be irréversible (e.g. forest préserves). To a certain degree 
the private market could develop a System of user charges that would 
capture some of the option demand, nevertheless such charges may be 
cumbersome or costly to collect. Consequently, government intervention 
may be justified in the présence of an option demand externality. 
Is there a case to be made for applying the option demand arguments 
to training programs ? To a certain degree society collectively may be 
willing to pay for the option to hâve a well-trained, flexible labour force 
available for use in times when such a workforce may be extremely 
valuable (e g. times of national emergency such as war or in times when 
goals such as growth or rapid technological change become paramount). 
To a country dépendent on fereign trade, this flexibility may be especially 
important to enable the country to move into changing foreign markets. 
Because of the obsolescence of human capital, the décision not to 
invest in training may be irréversible and therefore society may be willing 
to pay an extra premium for the option of having a pool of skilled labour 
from which to draw in the future, even if it is not fully utilized in the 
présent. If we allow the training of our labour force to deteriorate beyond 
a certain point it may not be possible to upgrade it in any reasonable 
length of time and at any reasonable cost. 
Similarly an individual trainee may be willing to pay small amount 
just to hâve the continued existence of training facilities so as to hâve 
the option to use them at some time in the future when the service would 
be extremely valuable to him, say perhaps if his future employment de-
pended on it. Companies may also be willing to pay small amounts for 
the option to draw from a pool of skilled labour or for the option to use 
certain training facifities when the need arises. 
As mentioned previously, the private market could develop a System 
of user charges that would capture at least some of the option demand. 
9 Burton WEISBROD, « Collective-Consumption Services of Individual Con-
sumption Goods, » Quarterly Journal of Economies, Vol. 78, August 1964, pp. 
471-477. 
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Nevertheless such charges may be cumbersome or costly to collect and 
therefore government intervention may be socially justifiable. 
HIGH RISK, UNCERTAINTY 
Private actors may be unwilling to invest in training because they 
find it too risky and uncertain a venture. To the extent that their private 
risk is greater than the social risk of the investment then the private 
market may yeild a less than socially optimal amount of training. 
Portfolio theory tells us that, other things equal, an investment has 
a higher value if its expected return is high, the variance of this return 
is low, and the yield of the investment is negatively correlated with the 
yield of other assets in our portfolio of wealth. The négative corrélation 
of yields is désirable because it provides risk averters with more certainty 
in the yield of their overall portfolio, since if the yield of one assel: is not 
forthcoming then the négative corrélation implies that the yield from 
the other asset will probably be forthcoming. Hence the existence of 
insurance policies which hâve a low (or négative) expected rate of return, 
a very high variance since one seldom collects, but where yields are 
perfectly negatively correlated with the yield of other assets such as our 
house, car or life. 
Différent types of training can be negatively correlated with each 
other. For example, the yield from being trained as a numeric machine 
programmer (computer tape driven basic machine work) may be nega-
tively correlated with the yield from being trained as a lathe operator 
since computer driven machines are replacing lathe operators. Conse-
quently, a lathe operator would value highly the chance to get training 
in numeric machine programming since that is the very skill that would 
replace him. This would be true even if the yield from numeric pro-
gramming had both a low expected return and a high variance. Its value 
to this particular worker lies in its négative corrélation with the yield 
from training as a lathe operator. As with other investments, in choosing 
the optimum mix of training, the trainee will consider not only the 
expected return and variance of the investment, but also its corrélation 
with the yields of other types of training. 
Because of his limited wealth, however, it is difficult for an indivi-
dual trainee to diversify his portfolio of wealth let alone his portfolio of 
training yields. Consequently, some form of collective actions may be 
appropriate. 
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A risk averter may try to avoid the risk associated with training by 
collectively agreeing to share the cost and benefits with other actors 
under the presumption that if some skills become obsolète then others 
will be more in demand. However, transactions costs and difficulties in 
establishing such private markets may be formidable. Governments by 
virtue of their size would be able to absorb the risk, since for any trainee 
they finance who looses, it is likely that there would be an offsetting one 
who gains. That is, the government portfolio would consist of various 
types of training, the yields of which are negatively correlated assuming 
that for every skill that becomes obsolète a new one becomes a premium 
skill. The government investment may be socially profitable even if the 
private market would not undertake the investment, since the government 
would serve as its own insurance agent for some of the private risk costs. 
Because of this possibility of the private market attaching a cost to a 
risk that is only a private risk and not a social risk, then the private 
market may again breakdown in providing a socially optimal amount of 
training and therefore government intervention may be warranted. 
In practice the government need not supply the training itself but 
rather may help finance it through a contingent loan System where the 
borrower repays the government only if the training is successful. The 
repayment would hâve to be sufficient to cover those who do not repay, 
but the borrower would be willing since it is a riskless venture to him. 
Or the government may want to provide the training and charge only 
those who benefit to cover the total cost. Of course the government 
would only undertake the project if its expected social benefits exceed its 
expected social costs. 
If the governement it getting involved to act as an insurance broker 
providing a diversified portfolio of training yields, it may also want to 
be sélective in the type of training it finances or provides. Specifically, 
it would want to provide a portfolio that is diversified in the sensé that 
individual yields are negatively correlated. Translating this into practice 
requires detailed knowledge of the dynamics of skill shortages and sub-
stitutions. For example, if the government décides to finance or provide 
training for a particular skill it may also want to finance the skill that is 
most likely to replace it. To use our previous example, if the government 
finances the training of lathe operators it may also want to finance the 
training of numeric machine programmers since this is the skill most 
likely to replace lathe operators. By doing so the government would 
diversify its portfolio and thereby increase its value. To put it more 
succinctly, if the government does not get involved in training, it would 
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want to consider not only the expected return and variance of its training 
investments, but also the diversification of its portfolio. 
To a certain degree large scale firms may serve a similar rôle as 
the government in financing a diverse portfolio involving training. When 
they train in large numbers it is likely that they will train both for skills 
that become obsolète and for skills that become in high demand. Con-
sequently, the yields from training are negatively correlated with each 
other — when some are high others are low. This ability for large firms 
to train various workers whose yields will be negatively correlated with 
each other may also account for the concentration of training in large 
firms and perhaps even their willingness to engage in some gênerai train-
ing for which the worker does not pay. 
MERIT GOODS 
A more positive rôle of government in training programs is justified 
if we believe that training has a merit good component. Society may feel 
that certain disadvantaged groups are « locked in » to their poverty con-
sumption and investment patterns and hence their présent comsump-
tion pattern may not be what is best for them in the long run. 
Society may then take it upon itself to expose individuals to training in 
the hope that in the longer run thèse individuals will themselves ratio-
nally purchase training and once again consumer sovereignty can apply. 
Society could also force the individual to invest in training but where 
consumer sovereignty it at least respected, society would probably choose 
to provide the service free, subsidize it, or force it on the individual 
contingent upon his receiving a government transfer payment. 
Justifying government intervention based on the merit good argu-
ment can be dangerous since it does hâve a « society knows best » ring 
to it, and practioners in the training évaluation area are ail too familiar 
with the phrase that « training is simply good for people and therefore 
governments ought to be involved. » Nevertheless it is not unreasonable 
to assume that some actors are simply acting irrationally and underin-
vesting in training (and perhaps overinvesting in éducation) and there-
fore a brief exposure to the benefits of training will hâve them investing 
more in it. Empirical évidence presented by Hansen, Weisbrod and 
Scanlon 10 suggests that for low achievers, training may be better than 
10 Lee HANSEN, Burton WEISBROD, and W. SCANLON, « Schooling and 
Earnings of Low Achievers, » American Economie Review, Vol. 60, June 1970, 
pp. 409-418. 
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schooling for raising their income. However, society has tended to stress 
the importance of éducation for this group. Responding to societal pres-
sures, low achievers may be overinvesting in éducation and underin-
vesting in training. Temporary government action may thereby be justified, 
perhaps in the form of providing the « correct » information on the 
desirability of alternative forms of investment in human capital. 
NON-COMPETITIVE MARKETS 
The previous discussion dealt with the conditions under which the 
free market, even under the assumptions of perfect compétition, may lead 
to a less than socially optimal amount of training. If private markets are 
not compétitive then a further rôle for the government may be justified. 
Natural monopoly for training services 
The provision of training services may be characterized by écono-
mies of scale such that the training industry in effect is a natural mono-
poly. In such a case the demand for training services is not sufficiently 
high to require that output be produced at minimum average cost; or 
conversely, the économies of scale to be had from training are so great 
that even the concentration of training in a single firm cannot exhaust 
thèse économies of scale. When training is provided in natural monopolies 
the supply of training is less than the compétitive supply and the price 
charged for training is greater than the compétitive price. 
Does there appear to be any real basis for thinking that this is an 
important reason for government intervention ? Can we identify natural 
monopolies ? The answer to thèse questions is difficult since a natural 
monopoly implies the existence of both économies of scale and insuf-
ficient demand to exhaust thèse économies of scale in a single firm. 
Suggestions hâve been made to the effect that trainning programs do 
hâve substantial économies of scale. Lees and Chiplin n point out that 
under the British Industrial Training Act small firms tend to be taxed 
so as to subsidize training in large firms under the presumption that 
« there are substantial économies of scale in training, which means that 
training by small firms is simply uneconomic. » In their study of the 
Neighbourhood Youth Corps, Somers and Stromsdorfer 12 give empirical 
n D. LEES, and B. CHIPLIN, «The Economies of Industrial Training» 
Lloyds Bank Review, Vol. 95, April 1970, p. 35. 
12 Gerald SOMERS and E. STROMSDORFER, A Cost-Effectiveness Study 
of the In-School and Summer Neighborhood Youth Corps, Madison, Wisconsin, 
Industrial Relations Research Institute, 1970, 435 pp. 
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évidence to suggest that économies of scale do exist in that program. In 
our discussion of risk and uncertainty we also indicated that large com-
panies can hedge against risk by diversifying their portfolio of training 
activities. Although thèse arguments suggest that économies of scale exist 
for training this does not establish the existence of a natural monopoly 
since in a rapidly changing economy the demand for training services 
will also be large. It is difficult to think of a training skill that is in such 
short demand that it will only be produced in one company. Consequently, 
we could hazard the generalization that although économies of scale 
probably exist in the provision of training services, the demand for such 
services is also large so that the efficient provision of training occurs in 
a large, but not monopolistic company. 
Imperfect capital markets 
Our previous discussion of externalities pointed out the importance 
of transactions cost in developing an efficient market for training services. 
Even if many of the arguments of market failure are really just situations 
where transactions costs are high, the individual trainee may not be able 
to bear the cost of thèse transactions because he does not hâve full access 
to capital markets. Lees and Chiplin 13 cite this as the « only one area 
of useful state intervention in the field of industrial training — the pro-
vision of finance to workers to help meet the cost of gênerai training. » 
Legally, a worker cannot offer his human capital as collatéral for 
a loan to invest in his training. Consequently he may be unable to finance 
the training even if it is profitable. This problem is especially true for 
low income workers who hâve limited assets and who cannot afford to 
pay for the cost of gênerai training by foregoing any of their income 
during the training period. 
Stigler 14 points out that this is not really a capital market imper-
fection since lenders are acting rationally given the légal constraint that 
they can't hold human capital as collatéral. Rather it is a labour market 
imperfection where the légal constraint really reduces the labourer's dis-
posable property rights by not allowing him to offer human capital 
as collatéral. Since society has deemed it socially désirable to impose this 
restriction on individuals it may hâve an obligation to alleviate unde-
13 D. LEES and B. CHIPLIN, « The Economies of Industrial Training » 
Lloyds Bank Review, Vol. 95, April 1970, p. 132. 
14 George STIGLER, « Imperfections in the Capital Market, » Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 75, June 1967, pp. 287-92. 
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sirable side-effects from the action. To the extent that one such side effect 
is the worker's inability to finance investment in themselves then govern-
ment intervention to rectify this situation is socially justifiable. In order 
to correct this imperfection economists hâve suggested such schemes as 
providing perspective trainees with contingent loans that they must repay 
only if their training is successful. 
Non-competitive firms in product market 
Because the demand for inputs is derived from the demand for a 
firm's output, the way a firm acts on the product market affects the way 
it acts on the market for its inputs. A monopolist on the product market 
not only sells less output at a higher price than does a compétitive firm, 
but also demands less of each input and, if it faces a less than perfectly 
elastic supply, pays a lower input price than would a compétitive firm on 
the product market. 
Translating this into the purchase of training services illustrâtes that 
firms operating in non-competitive product markets purchase less training 
and may pay a lower price for the training component of labour than 
firms operating in compétitive product markets. To remedy this, govern-
ments may want to intervene in the form of an anti-trust policy, tax-
subsidy scheme, price control or government provision of the service. 
Monopsony in the training market: 
If the purchaser of the training service is large relative to the size 
of the training market so that its purchases affect the price of the service, 
then the purchaser is a monopsonist in the training market. Because the 
firm's purchases affect the market price, it faces an upward sloping 
supply or average cost curve for the service. The corresponding marginal 
cost curve lies to the left of the supply curve and therefore the monopsonist 
purchases less training and pays a lower price for training than would a 
compétitive purchaser. 
Do we hâve reason to beleive that monopsony is prévalent in the 
market for training services ? Certainly individual workers who purchase 
training from firms (usually by accepting a lower wage rate during 
training) are compétitive purchasers. However firms that hire trained 
labour may well be monopsonistic purchasers of the skilled component 
of labour. It is not difficult to envisage a firm being so large relative to 
the market for particular skills that it exerts an influence over the price 
of that skill. This is especially true when the skills are specialized so that 
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the market has few actors or where transactions costs or inertia detter 
the mobility of skills (along with the labour that embodies the skill). In 
such circumstances the firm faces a less than perfectly elastic supply 
curve for the skill — to attract more of the skill it has to raise its price. 
Since monopsony in a factor market arises when the firm faces a 
less than perfectly elastic supply of the factor, then polieies designed to 
increase the elasticity or factor supplies would reduce monopsony. Infor-
mation concerning the returns to be had would encourage the response 
of factors to changes in their priées. So would the rapid production of 
training for scarce skills — that is, skills for which a large price increase 
resuit only in a small supply increase. To this effect, the government may 
hâve a rôle overcoming monopsony pricing by providing information on 
premium training skills in short supply. 
Market imperfections and the theory of second best 
Imperfections in markets related to the market for training services 
may hâve serious implications for optimal pricing rules in training mar-
kets. The gênerai theory of second best implies that if market imperfec-
tions exist in any markets, then following the usual optimal pricing rules 
in related markets may not be socially désirable. As Richard Judy15 
illustrâtes, in the case of training it may not be socially désirable to hâve 
those who benefit from training pay for training, provided there are 
imperfections in markets related to the training market. Examples of such 
related market imperfections exist, although it is difficult to asses their 
as collatéral or the firm's operating in a non-competitive product market 
even though it purchases training in a compétitive market. 
The implications of this are profound since we do know that such 
redated market imperfections exist, although it is difficult to asses their 
quantitative impact. The correct rôle of the government under such cir-
cumstances is made even more complex, since it may not be socially 
optimal for it to follow the usual optimal pricing rules and it may not 
be socially optimal for the government to try to correct what it believes 
to be imperfections in the training markets. This does not preclude the 
rôle of a government, it merely makes its rôle more complex. And until 
the implications of the theory of second best are translated into opéra-
is Richard JUDY, « Conceptual Problems and a Theoretical Framework for 
Analysing the Distribution of Benefits from Government Assisted Training-In-
Industry, » Toronto, Systems Research Group, 1970, p. 11. 
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tional rules of thumb for décision makers, little can be said about the 
correct rôle of the government in the face of such market imperfections. 
EQUITY OR DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The previous discussion concentrated on the possibility of a break-
down in the allocative efficiency in the private market supply of training. 
Society is also concerned with the distributional equity aspects of training 
programs and the degree to which training can be used to yield oppor-
tunités and income to people who are poor, unemployed, unskilled, 
discriminated, résidents of economically depressed areas or who are 
otherwise disadvantaged. By raising their productivity, training can in-
crease the wages of the disadvantaged. And according to the empirical 
évidence presented by Hansen, Weisbrod, and Scanlon,16 training is 
more effective than schooling for the disadvantaged. According to Oi1 7 
training can also increase their employability since firms are reluctant 
to lay off trained workers in an économie downswing for fear of loosing 
their fixed costs associated with such workers. 
Since society is concerned not only with redistributing income but 
also with how the income is redistributed then subsidizing training pro-
grams may be preferred to transfer programs because the former allows 
the worker to earn his income rather than receive it as a dole or handout. 
This could be true even if the transfer program were more efficient in 
that more benefits went to the poor or administrative costs were lower. 
In addition, society may use redistribution as a way of « buying be-
havior » of spécifie groups. To this end it may be efficient for society 
to bear part of the cost of training the disadvantaged to buy their security 
both by redistributing income in their favour and by making them part 
of a work society that they would be less likely to distrust. Goodman 18 
indicates that to a large degree private firms respond to social unrest by 
providing training as a form of insurance in areas of récent unrest. How-
ever, since they are unable to exclude other firms in the area from the 
benefits (social stability) of their actions, we can expect less training to 
be provided than if they collectively provided the training. 
16 Lee HANSEN, Burton WEISBROD, and W. SCANLON, « Schooling and 
Earnings of Low Achievers. » American Economie Review, Vol. 60, June 1970, pp. 
409-418. 
17
 Walter OI, « Labour as a Quasi-Fixed Factor. » Journal of Political Eco-
nomy, Vol. 70, December 1962, pp. 538-55. 
18
 Paul S. GOODMAN, « Hiring, Training and Retaining the Hard-Core. » 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 9, October 1969, pp. 54-66. 
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Appartîent-il à l'État d'absorber le coût de l'apprentissage ? 
Même si on trouve de nombreuses études sur l'évaluation des coûts-avantages 
des programmes de formation au travail, on n'a accordé jusqu'ici qu'assez peu 
d'attention au rôle de l'État dans ce domaine. 
La question fondamentale suivante se pose : le marché libre du travail offre-t-
il suffisamment de possibilités pour assurer dans l'ensemble à la main-d'œuvre le 
degré de formation professionnelle qu'on pourrait considérer comme optimal ? 
Sinon, le gouvernement pourrait-il intervenir à sa place ? 
L'article précédent traite cette question en appliquant les plus récentes décou-
vertes de la macroéconomie au fonctionnement des marchés du travail en général 
et aux programmes de formation professionnelle en particulier. 
Dans son exposé, l'auteur s'efforce de tracer le rôle du gouvernement, lorsque 
le marché du travail n'est pas en mesure d'assurer, par la formation sur place, le 
renouvellement de la main-d'œuvre. 
L'entreprise privée n'est pas toujours capable de répondre aux normes qu'exi-
gent les conditions optimales de formation. Les raisons en sont nombreuses. D'une 
part, la formation peut être source d'avantages gratuits pour certaines entreprises 
ou communautés qui, tout en ne se préoccupant guère de la formation de leur 
personnel, font quand même appel à des travailleurs qualifiés, s'appropriant ainsi 
à leur profit le savoir et l'expérience pour lesquels d'autres entreprises ont payé le 
prix fort. Conséquence : ces dernières entreprises hésitent à donner une formation 
qui ne leur rapporte finalement rien. D'autre part, étant donné l'impossibilité rela-
tive dans laquelle on se trouve d'évaluer à son coût exact le prix de la formation, 
il s'ensuit que c'est l'apprenti qui en récolte les avantages en obtenant une rémuné-
ration plus élevée sur le marché du travail. Ce sont là les motifs qui font que 
l'entreprise n'est pas apte à répondre aux besoins de formation professionnelle du 
marché du travail. 
L'analyse de la situation permet de faire la constatation suivante : ou l'entre-
prise procure à ses employés une formation exclusive et elle a des chances d'en 
retirer des avantages ; ou la formation sera plus générale et il se peut que ce soit 
d'autres employeurs qui en profitent. 
La formation est un bien collectif dont on ne peut être certain que le coût 
est payé par celui à qui il rapporte. L'employeur qui le fournit peut avoir à dé-
frayer en totalité ou en partie le coût de la formation dite générale, ce qui l'incite 
à le donner à contre-coeur. En effet, si la formation est altruiste dans le sens qu'elle 
tend à accroître la productivité marginale davantage chez les employeurs qui ne 
la parrainent pas que chez ceux qui la soutiennent, ces derniers ont intérêt à ne 
pas la donner, car s'ils le font, non seulement ils auraient à en défrayer le coût, 
mais ils risqueraient en outre de se voir enlever les travailleurs dont ils auraient 
assumé la formation partout où leur productivité marginale est plus grande. En 
effet, s'ils désirent le garder à leur service, il leur faudra payer un salaire égal à 
sa productivité marginale la plus haute. Au surplus, même si la formation ne leur 
coûtait rien dans le sens qu'elle serait en quelque sorte un sous-produit de son 
activité normale, l'employeur aurait encore intérêt à ne pas la donner de crainte 
de perdre les services de son employé. 
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De ce qui précède, on peut donc conclure que les entreprises n'ont aucune 
incitation véritable à dispenser une formation générale. C'est pour cela que l'on 
entend souvent dans la bouche des employeurs l'observation suivante : « Nous ne 
voulons pas qu'il (l'employé) devienne trop bon, car il pourrait s'en aller ailleurs ». 
Dans ce contexte, toutefois, il faut retenir que la formation peut avoir un effet 
d'entraînement du fait que l'employé, qui a ainsi acquis une certaine compétence 
peut obtenir une promotion, ce qui laisse sa place vacante pour une autre personne 
et permet d'embaucher un sans-travail. Ils sont deux alors à profiter de la forma-
tion, le premier qui obtient un meilleur salaire par suite de son avancement, le 
second parce qu'il trouve ainsi un travail rémunérateur. Ce dernier point est im-
portant quand Ton tient compte du coût social du chômage. La formation profes-
sionnelle tendrait donc ainsi à réduire les inconvénients économiques résultant du 
chômage des travailleurs assimilés. Il s'ensuit donc que la société globale peut être 
disposée à courir le risque de former une main-d'œuvre compétente, mobile afin 
d'être en mesure d'en tirer profit au moment opportun et aussi parce qu'elle doit 
faire face à une usure de ses effectifs qui est nécessairement irréversible. 
La formation professionnelle doit être aussi considérée du point de vue du 
travailleur lui-même. Celui-ci peut être prêt à payer en tout ou en partie la for-
mation qu'il reçoit en vue d'en retirer des avantages dans l'avenir. Il s'agit de sa 
part de l'acceptation d'un risque calculé. Il le fera dans la mesure où il y a de 
bonnes chances d'y trouver son compte. 
En effet, si l'on considère la formation professionnelle un peu à la manière 
d'un placement, il faut convenir que ni le travailleur ni l'employeur ordinaire ne 
peuvent guère diversifier beaucoup leur porte-feuille, étaler leurs placements. Un 
travailleur ne peut pas se spécialiser dans dix métiers ; un employeur ordinaire ne 
peut pas donner toute la gamme de la formation. 
La situation n'est pas la même dans le cas de l'État qui peut pour ainsi dire 
se permettre d'assumer plusieurs types de formation. Les risques peuvent se répartir. 
Les échecs et les réussites pourront s'équilibrer, d'autant plus qu'il reste toujours 
possible au gouvernement de prévoir les changements technologiques, d'où sa 
possibilité d'orienter son choix du côté des carrières prometteuses d'avenir. 
Au surplus, il existe dans la société une foule d'individus désavantagés dont 
il y aurait intérêt à favoriser la formation professionnelle dans l'espoir que ces 
individus en retirent des avantages. On peut se demander si, au cours des dernières 
années, l'on n'a pas trop mis l'accent sur l'instruction générale et pas assez sur la 
formafion professionnelle. De toute manière, il n'est pas dit que les sommes con-
sacrées à la mise en place de programmes de formation professionnelle ne sont 
pas préférables à la politique de paiements de transfert pur* et simples. 
Ceci explique, d'une part, que le marché du travail n'est pas apte à fournir 
quantitativement f i a somme » de formation professionnelle socialement désirable 
et que, par conséquent, l'intervention publique est souhaitable. 
Il reste à voir quelle pourrait être la nature exacte de son rôle. Doit-il se 
charger de la formation professionnelle, la subventionner ou tout simplement la 
promouvoir ? 
